Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 28
Number 3 Spring 2005

Article 6

1-1-2005

International Law and the Palestine Refugees
John Quigley

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John Quigley, International Law and the Palestine Refugees, 28 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 405 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol28/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

International Law and the Palestine

Refugees
By JOHN QUIGLEY

The theme of this panel, as well as of the conference as a whole, is
the need to follow international law as a means of solving the
outstanding issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is a tall order,
given that international law has not been at the forefront at major turns
in the conflict over the past century.
The marginalization of
international law has, in fact, led to a situation in which restoration to
full compliance with international law is quite difficult.
International law was sidelined in the Palestine question from the
outset. Britain, as mandatory power in Palestine after World War I,
promoted Jewish migration, even though this migration threatened the
exercise of self-determination by the predominantly Arab population of
Palestine.' After World War II, the United Nations took up the
Palestine question by combining it with the question of resolving the
situation of Jewish displaced persons in central and eastern Europe,
who in large numbers wanted to leave that area. Palestine provided a
convenient place to put them, since the major powers were unwilling to
accept them as migrants, as would have been the preference of many
displaced persons.2 Jewish Agency leader Chaim Weizmann said,
doubtlessly correctly, that the partition plan "was motivated preeminently by the purpose of solving once and for all the Jewish question
in Europe, to get rid
of the concentration camps and the aftermath of
3
Hitler's holocaust.,
By placing the issue of the displaced Jews ahead of the issue of
finding an appropriate solution for Palestine, the General Assembly,
1. Report of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, U.N.GAOR, 2d Sess.,
Supp. No. 11, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/364 (1947).
2. Earl Harrison, Report to the President of the United States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1945, at A38.
3. Letter from Chaim Weizmann to President Truman (June 24, 1949), in [1.9491 6
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF UNITED STATES 1168, 1172 (1977).
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then controlled by the European and North American powers, in 1947
came up with a partition plan that would have given most of the
territory of Palestine to a Jewish state, even though Jews owned only six
percent of the land and numbered only one-third of the population,
most of them recent migrants.
International law was again sidetracked in dealing with the June
1967 War. By that time, the United States had assumed a role of
protecting Israel. Having been in close contact with Israel prior to
Israel's decision to invade Egypt, the United States, alone among U.N.
member states, was aware that Egypt was not about to invade Israel,
and hence that the 1967 hostilities represented aggression on Israel's
part.'
In the 1980s the U.N. General Assembly tried to organize an
international conference that would have been based on principles of
international law in seeking resolution of the issues that needed to be
resolved between the Israelis and Palestinians.6 The United States,
again protecting Israel, opposed such a conference and kept it from
taking place. Instead, in 1991, it organized a conference in Madrid
designed to lead to bilateral negotiations between Palestinians and
Israelis, knowing full well that Israel, predominant over the Palestinians
economically, politically, and militarily, would have no incentive to
comply with international norms in the negotiations.
Once the Israelis and Palestinians began to deal with each other
following the Oslo meetings of 1993, international law again took a back
seat, as Israel rapidly expanded its unlawful settlements in Palestinian
The U.N. Security Council tried to declare Israel's
territory.
construction of the settlements illegal, since it rendered the possibility of
peace on principles of law even more remote. The United States, using
its veto power, prevented the U.N. resolution on the rationale that so
long as a bilateral process was in place the Security Council should not
condemn Israel.7
International law has been sidetracked in particular on the

4. Resolution Adopted on the Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian
Question, G.A. Res. 181,2 U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
5. JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 161-67
(1990).
6. G.A. Res. 38/58 C, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess. Supp. No. 47, at 47, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1983).
7. See U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3538 (1995);
Barbara Crossette, U.S. Vetoes a CondemnationIn U.N. of Israeli Land Seizure, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18,1995, at A10.
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question of the Palestinians who were displaced in 1948 from the
territory that became the State of Israel in that year. From the very
beginning of this situation, the U.N. General Assembly, as Mr. Said's
paper explains, called on Israel to repatriate the Palestinians, relying on
the premise that repatriation was required under principles of
customary international law.
In 1948, the General Assembly set up a conciliation commission for
Palestine, one of whose tasks was to secure implementation of the
repatriation of displaced Palestinians. Israel persistently refused the
entreaties of the commission to allow entry to these Palestinians. The
General Assembly annually repeated its demand that Israel repatriate
them, but to no avail. 8
Mr. Said appropriately points out that forcing persons out of their
homeland is unlawful, and that, by any fair reading of the evidence, the
vast majority of the Palestinians who left the territory taken by Zionist
military units were forcibly expelled.'
The circumstances of the
departure of these Palestinians are, nonetheless, not an essential
element of their right to be repatriated. It is unlawful for a state to
exclude displaced persons, even if they left voluntarily. A state is
required under international law to allow the return of persons who
either hold, or are entitled to, its nationality. Were that not the case,
other states would be forced to shelter persons otherwise having no
right to remain in their territory.
When, for example, the United States occupied Iraq in 2003, it did
not attempt to prevent the return of Iraqis who happened to be out of
the country for business or pleasure, even though they had left
voluntarily. Had the United States refused them entry it would have
violated the rights of those states where these Iraqis found themselves,
as those states had no obligation to keep them.
The obligation to repatriate is not affected by a change in
sovereignty in a territory. A state newly sovereign assumes the
obligations of the predecessor state in regard to persons who were
nationals or permanent residents of the predecessor state. Israel was a
new state. Under international law, it assumed the obligation to respect
the residency and nationality rights of those entitled to it under Britain's
mandate in Palestine.' °

8. 7a. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Res. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
9. John Quigley, Displaced Palestiniansand a Right of Return, 39 HARV. IN'TL L.
171,173-81 (1998).
10. John Quigley, Mass Displacement and the Individual Right of Return, 68 BRIT.
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In violation of this obligation, Israel refused to regard the displaced
Palestinians as entitled to Israeli nationality." Neighboring states,
chiefly Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, found themselves with large
populations of Palestinians and gave them shelter, even though they
were not obligated to do so. These states were forced into that position
by Israel's illegal refusal to repatriate.
The customary law as it stood at mid-century is reflected in the
1930 draft of a convention on nationality, which provided: "those
persons who were nationals of the first state become nationals of the
successor state, unless in accordance with the provisions of its law they
decline the nationality of the successor state. 12 The drafters, a research
School, said they found this rule in customary
team at the Harvard
3 Law
law.1
international
An expulsion of Greeks by Turkey a decade earlier had been
widely regarded as unlawful, 14 even though Greece, unable to convince
Turkey to repatriate the Greeks, in turn expelled Turks from Greece
and formalized the arrangement by a treaty with Turkey. 5 Lord
secretary, called the treaty "a thoroughly bad
Curzon, Britain's foreign
6
and vicious solution.'
The question of implementing the right of repatriation is
complicated by the fact that the right is an individual right. Each
displaced Palestinian is entitled to be repatriated. Thus, the lawful way
of resolving the issue need not involve negotiations between Israel and
Palestine. A displaced Palestinian should be able to approach a border
checkpoint and be admitted by Israel.
With large numbers of displaced individuals, as in this situation,
international assistance is often provided to prepare the way for entry.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees normally performs this
Y.B. INT'L L. 65, 88-111 (1997).
11. Nationality Law, 1952,6 L.S.I. 50 (1952).
12. RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, The Law of
Nationality, art. 18, in NATIONALITY, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES, TERRITORIAL
WATERS: DRAFTS OF CONVENTIONS PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE FIRST
CONFERENCE ON THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE HAGUE, 1930

(1929), reprintedin 23 Am. J. Int'l L. 13, 15 (Supp. 1929).
13. Id. art. 18 cmt. at 61.
14. E. Reut-Nicolussi, Displaced Persons and International Law, 2 RECUEIL dES
COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 1, 29 (1948).
15. Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations
(Lausanne), Jan. 30, 1923, art. 1, 32 L.N.T.S. 75.
16. STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE AND
TURKEY 341 (1932).
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work in post-conflict situations. It could do so to facilitate the
repatriation of Palestinians to Israel.
Presently the question of repatriation is, unfortunately, part of
bilateral negotiations between Palestine and Israel. As far back as late
1948, Israel refused to consider repatriation apart from a political
settlement with its Arab neighbors. Representing the United States in
the U.N. General Assembly in December 1948, Dean Rusk decried that
stance, saying that the displaced Palestinians should not be "pawns to a
political settlement." In other words, their repatriation was a matter of
right, and a matter that should be handled apart from any other issue.
In the Palestine-Israel negotiations that began in 1999 and
continued into 2000, the Palestinian side insisted on repatriation as a
right of each displaced Palestinian, and as a right that it, as the political
entity representing the collectivity of Palestinians, was not entitled to
forego. Israel refused to negotiate seriously on the issue.
Although, as Mr. Said states, the Palestinian leadership has at times
shown willingness to make significant compromises on the right of
repatriation, it has taken the issue very seriously, and it was probably a
key issue in Mr. Arafat's unwillingness to accede to the terms proposed
by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David, Maryland, in
July 2000. Barak refused to accept the repatriation of any significant
number of the displaced Palestinians.
The displaced Palestinians should not have to lobby for their right
of return, either vis-a-vis Israel or vis-a-vis the Palestinian leadership.
The right is guaranteed by human rights norms. Just as a state that
tortures is obliged to desist without being cajoled and without
negotiation, so a state that refuses to repatriate is obliged to desist,
namely, by repatriating.
Nonetheless, Palestinians worldwide organized themselves in the
run-up to the 1999 negotiations. Internet communication was usefully
employed to mobilize Palestinians to make it clear to one and all that
they would not concede their right to repatriation. This organizing
effort may have played a significant role in convincing the Palestinian
leadership of the need to hold to principle on this issue.
Mr. Said is doubtless on target, in light of the practicalities of the
situation, in saying that the displaced Palestinians must mobilize
effectively, to enhance the possibility of repatriation. This point
represents a highly useful recommendation to move the issue along.
The displaced Palestinians want to be accorded a right to return, and
this is true both of those who might, in the event, elect to exercise it, and
those who might not. They feel strongly, and correctly as international

410
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law has it, that Israel has an obligation to repatriate them.
The issue of the displaced Palestinians has turned out to be
arguably the most intractable wedge separating the Israelis and
Palestinians. It is, however, an issue that is susceptible of being
resolved. Chances for such a resolution will be significantly enhanced to
the extent the international community ensures that considerations of
justice and legality are at the center of discussion.

